Abstract-Online rating systems are widely used to facilitate making decisions on the web. For fame or profit, people may try to manipulate such systems by posting unfair evaluations. Therefore, determining objective rating scores of products or services becomes a very important yet difficult problem. Existing solutions are mostly majority based, also employing temporal analysis and clustering techniques. However, they are still vulnerable to sophisticated collaborative attacks. In this paper we propose an iterative rating algorithm which is very robust against collusion attacks as well as random and biased raters. Unlike previous iterative methods, our method is not based on comparing submitted evaluations to an approximation of the final rating scores, and it entirely decouples credibility assessment of the cast evaluations from the ranking itself. This makes it more robust against sophisticated collusion attacks than the previous iterative filtering algorithms. We provide a rigorous proof of convergence of our algorithm based on the existence of a fixed point of a continuous mapping which also happens to be a stationary point of a constrained optimization objective. We have implemented and tested our rating method using both simulated data as well as real world movie rating data. Our tests demonstrate that our model calculates realistic rating scores even in the presence of massive collusion attacks and outperforms well-known algorithms in the area. The results of applying our algorithm on the real-world data obtained from MovieLens conforms highly with the rating scores given by Rotten Tomatoes movie critics as domain experts for movies.
INTRODUCTION
H UMAN computation is a new model of distributed computing [1] , [2] in which the computational power of machines is augmented by the cognitive power of humans. The main benefit of such a model comes from the fact that many problems which are trivial to humans are still intractable for machines. Human computation has been employed to solve a wide variety of problems such as spam detection [3] , question answering 1 , tagging photos [4] , as well as many others [5] .
E-Commerce is another area in which human computation has been widely used to assess quality of products as well as trustworthiness of people. Continuous growth of online commercfse as well as of many other forms of online interactions crucially depends on trust management; for example, when can a buyer trust a seller or have confidence in the quality of a product sold online. Relying on evaluations cast by others is a very common approach to assessing quality in such systems [6] , [5] , [7] . People can easily share their opinions or experience of using a service, purchasing a product, etc. with other community members to help them judge an item or person who have no direct experience with. Online Rating Systems collect and aggregate such opinions to build a rating score or level of trustworthiness for items and people [6] . These rating scores reflect the overall quality of items from community's point of view. Various types of items are rated on the web. For instance, in Yelp 2 people rate local businesses; in IMDb 3 movies are rated and customers rate products in Amazon online market. 4 For simplicity, we use term 'product' to generally represent such items.
One important issue in using people's feedback to assess quality of products is the credibility of such feedback. Many pieces of evidence [8] , [9] show that some users try to manipulate the ratings of products by casting unfair evaluations, either individually or collaboratively [10] , [11] . Unfair evaluations are evaluations which are cast regardless of the quality of the product and are usually given based on personal vested interest of the users. For example, people may attempt to promote products in which they have vested interest by posting or buying supporting feedback or may try to demote their competitors' products by casting negative feedback on such products [9] , [8] . A collaborative unfair evaluation, also called a collusion, by its nature, is more sophisticated and harder to deal with than unfair evaluations cast individually [10] . Although collusion detection has been widely studied in the recent literature [12] , [13] , [11] , [10] , some serious challenges still remain.
Generally, existing collusion detection techniques rely on either using temporal and behavioral indicators to identify colluding groups [12] , [13] or on continuous monitoring of the behavior of the system, looking for unusual activities [10] .
Identifying colluding groups usually involves looking for cliques; however, relying on solving or approximating such NP-hard problems clearly degrades the performance of the system. Heuristic approaches, such as the Frequent Itemset Mining technique [14] used in [12] , do not solve the problem either, without impacting the accuracy of the system. Tuning indicators or monitoring systems in order to make them sufficiently sensitive to collusion attacks, without an excessive number of false alarms, can be a daunting task, usually relying on machine learning techniques. However, preparing an adequate training dataset for such systems is a serious challenge [12] .
Moreover, existing collusion detection systems generally use local quality metrics, i.e., metrics which are calculated from a small subset of data, and are thus vulnerable to manipulation. The more global the metric is, the more effort is needed to manipulate it. In order to manipulate a quality metric which is calculated based on the behavior of the entire community, one must change the apparent sentiment of the community. For online communities with millions of users this might be an extremely difficult task. For example, the dependence of the PageRank of any particular web page on the PageRanks of virtually all other web pages on the Internet is what makes the PageRank robust against manipulation [15] .
In this paper we propose an iterative method to help address the above problems. Our method first reduces the problem of rating of a product to an ''election''. In such an election, users' feedback is seen as a vote on the most appropriate rating level for the product from a list of a few (usually at most ten) available levels. We propose an iterative vote aggregation algorithm which for each level in each election list calculates how credible it is to be accepted as the overall community sentiment about the product. Using such calculated credibility degrees, we assign each voter a trustworthiness degree reflecting to what extent she has behaved in accordance with the community sentiment. In the next round of iteration we employ these trustworthiness ranks to recalculate such credibility degrees for each level. We iterate this process until it converges, i.e., until the newly calculated credibility degrees are sufficiently close to the previous ones. Such credibility degrees of rating levels are then used to produce rating scores of products. Such decoupling of the credibility assessment from the rating procedure not only makes the rating more robust, but also allows the system to choose a scoring method which is best suited for the intended application. We present the test results for our method on data involving sloppy reviewers as well as large collusion attacks using both simulated datasets and real world movie rating data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the fundamental concepts and basic notation used in our rating model. In Section 3 we describe our iterative algorithm for calculating credibility levels and trust ranks. In Section 4 we extend our basic vote aggregation algorithm to make it even more robust against malicious activities. In Section 5 an example scenario as well as implementation details of our software prototype are presented. Section 6 contains the evaluation results. Section 7 is devoted to some of the related work and finally our conclusions are presented in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES

Reducing Rating to Voting
The rating method we introduce in this paper is based on the idea of reducing rating to voting. In rating systems we have a list of products to be rated by a group of users. Every user can express her opinion on the quality of a product by choosing the quality level which describes the best her opinion about the product. In most rating systems, the rating score assigned to a product is a (possibly weighted) average of the quality levels which the raters have chosen.
In ''reducing rating to voting'' model, we look at the rating process as an election. An election can be defined as the process of choosing one item from a finite list of items. In case of rating, the voters are the people who are rating the product. The candidates, for which we later use the technical term 'items', are all possible values which a voter can choose to express her opinion about the product. These possible values are usually provided in the form of a classic Likert type scale [16] , e.g., from 1 star to express the lowest quality to 5 stars to express the highest quality. Since each of these possible choices reflects a particular level of quality, we call them the quality levels. The outcome of of such an ''election'', determined through our vote aggregation algorithm, reflects the prevailing opinion of the community on the quality of the product.
To describe the essence of our method very briefly, our voting model iteratively calculates how credible each quality level in each election list is, to be accepted as the community sentiment about the product and call it 'degree of credibility'. Using such calculated degrees, we assign each voter a score reflecting to what extent she has behaved in accordance with the community sentiment. We call this score degree of conformance to the community. In the next round of iteration we employ these conformance degrees to recalculate credibility degrees for each quality level, proceeding in this manner until the credibility degrees have converged. Thus, such an iterative procedure calculates simultaneously the credibility degrees of levels for each product as well as the trustworthiness of each voter, reflecting her conformance with the prevailing community sentiment.
Such an approach is justified by the fact that the success of a product is measured by its community acceptance and popularity. Thus, in many applications, such as, for example, rating of commercial products, the community sentiment can indeed be taken as the ''ground truth'' for quality control. Therefore, conformance with the prevailing community sentiment can be used as a measure for the quality of user's contributions and consequently as a basis of determining user's trust rank. Consequently, in the sequel we use the term trust to refer to the degree of conformance of a user with the prevailing community sentiment.
In order to make such estimates of credibility degrees robust against possible unfair voting practices, the assessment of the trustworthiness of voters should have the following features (at the moment we allow these features to be specified both very vaguely and in a somewhat circular way; subsequently they will be made rigorous).
1. voters who vote on a large number of lists, and whose choices are largely in agreement with the prevailing sentiment of the community of voters, should obtain higher level of trustworthiness than the voters who vote on only a few of these lists, or vote inconsistently with the prevailing sentiment; 2. voters who seldom vote or voters who vote more or less randomly, just to be seen as active in the community, and then choose to vote unfairly on a few particular lists for their choices which are not favored by the remaining voters, should not be able to secure election of their choices even if such colluding voters are a large majority for those particular lists.
We now proceed with making the above ideas rigorous.
Notation
Assume that in a voting system N voters V 1 ; . . . ; V N participate in L elections with the corresponding lists of candidates
g. Voters are asked to choose the ''best'' item on each list. Not every voter is obliged to vote for the best item on every list, but can choose to vote on a subset of these lists. In our reduction of rating to voting, each list corresponds to a product, and the items on the list correspond to quality levels of such a product (e.g., one star, two stars,. . .).
Based on the voters' choices in elections, we will calculate a measure of 'trust' for each voter. We denote such trustworthiness of a voter V r by T r .
The degree of agreement of the community members on each particular quality level is reflected in its calculated 'credibility degree'. The credibility degree of a quality level I i on list L l is denoted by li .
Let us use notation r ! li to denote the fact that a voter V r has participated in voting for the best object on list L l and has chosen item I l i . Also, let n l denote the number of quality levels on a list l; thus, n l ¼ jL l j. For each quality level I l i on the list L l we will keep track of its credibility degree at the step of iteration p, denoted by 
BASIC VOTE AGGREGATION ALGORITHM
Algorithm 1 is our vote aggregation algorithm. We now explain how the algorithm works; to make it easier to follow, we explain the steps of the algorithm using an example.
Algorithm 1 Basic Vote Aggregation Algorithm.
Initialization: Let " 9 0 be the precision threshold ! 1 a discrimination setting parameter, and
Repeat:
until: k ðpþ1Þ À ðpÞ k 2 G ".
Example. In a sample rating system, five voters ðr 1 ; . . . ; r 5 Þ cast rating scores on the quality of six different products ðL 1 ; . . . ; L 6 Þ. Recall that every product is represented by an election. There are also five quality levels ðI 1 ; . . . ; I 5 Þ available for reviewers to use to express their opinion.
Assume that every reviewer has evaluated every product. Table 1a shows such evaluations. For example, 
In the usual election model, in the last election I 1 wins because it has received 3 votes out of 5. However, when we look at the history of the voters' choices, r 2 and r 3 , who have voted for I 2 in the last election, have voted for the winners in all past elections. This means that they have been always behaving close to community consensus. On the other hand r 1 , r 4 , and r 5 who have voted for I 1 do not conform to community consensus in most of the past elections. Therefore, we can argue that in the last election the I 2 should win, despite the fact that the majority have voted for I 1 .
In the proposed algorithm we start with the usual vote count, where every vote is worth 1, and accordingly also set the initial values of trust ranks of all voters to 1 (Equation (1) Table 1b .
In the iterative section of the algorithm, each voter first gets her new trustworthiness rank using the Equation (3). The new trust ranks of the evaluators are the sum of the ranks of all the items which she has voted for. Using the calculated trust ranks, we re calculate using Equation (4) the credibility levels for all items on all lists (i.e., for all quality levels on every list).
The value of the parameter determines the robustness of our algorithm against unfair voters. Higher values of increasingly favor voters with high compliance with the prevailing community sentiment and penalize harsher for votes given to less favored candidates. While this makes our system more robust, large values of increasingly marginalize a significant fraction of honest, but less successful voters. We conducted experiments to assess the impact of different values of on the accuracy of the obtained results. The results are shown in Section 6. We have run our experiments with ¼ 2.
Going back to our example, reviewers r 2 and r 3 receive the value 0.55 from the last election while the rest get 0.83. In the same manner, as reflected in Equation (3), the new trustworthiness rank of each reviewer is the sum of ranks of all items he has voted for. Now we recalculate the ranks of items using Equation (4); thus, each received vote is now worth the present trustworthiness rank of the voter giving this vote. We continue such iterations until the ranks stop changing significantly, i.e., we stop when k ðpþ1Þ À ðpÞ k 2 G ", where " is a threshold corresponding to a desired precision adequate for the particular application; in our experiments it was in the range 10 À4 À 10 À12 with the algorithm terminating after 10 to 40 iterations.
The final results of running the proposed algorithm on our example scenario are shown in Table 1c . The final credibility degrees for I 1 and I 2 obtained after 22 iterations are 0.20 and 0.98 respectively; thus, I 2 wins the last election despite the majority voting for I 1 .
Calculating Rating Scores
Let l , 1 l L, represent the product corresponding to voting list L l . Every voting lists consist of a set of quality levels and their corresponding credibility degrees. We can now obtain a rating score Rð l Þ of each product l , using such credibility degrees ðÞ l ¼ h 1 ; . . . ; n i in a way which suits the particular application best. For example, if the rating scores have to reflect where the community sentiment is centered, we can simply choose the quality level with the highest credibility degree as the rating score Rð l Þ of l . Such a rating score does not involve any averaging and is most indicative of the community's prevailing sentiment. For instance, the rating score of the product L 6 in our earlier example will be 2, which is the quality level with the highest credibility degree.
On the other hand, if one wishes to obtain a score which emphasizes such prevailing sentiment, but, to a varying degree, also takes into account dissenting views, she can form a weighted average of the form
where q ! 1 is a parameter. As q increases, such rank converges to the previous maximum credibility rank, while for smaller values of q we obtain a significant averaging effect. We tested the impact of different values of q on the accuracy of the algorithm and the results are shown in Section 6; in our implementations and testings we have used q ¼ 1:5.
In our example the rating score of the product L 6 represented here by 6 will be 
A REFINEMENT OF THE VOTE AGGREGATION ALGORITHM
With the basic voting algorithm, proposed in the previous section, the trust rank of a voter r depends on the sum of the credibility levels of items which she has voted for
On the other hand, the credibility levels li of these items in turn depend on their level of approval by the community of voters. While this ensures that the trust ranks of voters who have consistently voted for items with high endorsement by the community will be high, there is still one possible way in which people can obtain high trust ranks unjustifiably: even poor voters can have small but not zero gain in trustworthiness from items they have voted for. Thus, if they voted in a very large number of product evaluations, even if they have cast votes with little effort or even randomly, they might accumulate a high trust rank by accumulating a very large number of small, but positive values of li . For this reason in this section we refine the basic version of our algorithm to address this issue.
In reality, the number of votes cast by most community members is not very high. For instance, in the MovieLens 100 k dataset 5 , in which 1,682 movies are rated by 943 evaluators, the average number of votes cast by an evaluator is 106, while just 5 users have cast more than 500 votes (see more analysis results in Section 6). It is quite possible that such relatively high number of votes might have been cast in order to obtain an undeserved high trust rank.
To solve this problem, we modify the method of calculating trust ranks and credibility levels to make sure that only people who have cast high quality opinions can gain high trust ranks. To explain how we accomplish this, let k r ¼ jfi : r ! ligj denote the total number of votes cast by voter r and let be the average number of votes cast per user; we now make the trust rank T r of a voter r depend linearly not on the sum P l;i:r!li li of credibility levels of items, but on the mean 1=k r P l;i:r!li li , while also making the trust rank T r depend on the total number of votes via a function which is almost linear for the number of votes up to the average number of votes per evaluator, and whose growth decreases as the number of votes increases beyond . We empirically evaluated accuracy of our algorithm with various choices of such a function and obtained the best performance by setting
A plot of the function tanhðx=4Þ is shown on Fig. 1 ; for values x the function grows essentially linearly in x, but, since it has a horizontal asymptote y ¼ 1, it increasingly diminishes the impact of excessively large number of votes. More generally, we can set
Thus, for our choice,
We can now redefine the method of calculation of trust ranks and credibility levels with such a generic function gðk r Þ as follows:
Convergence of such an algorithm can be easily proved with an essentially identical proof as for the basic algorithm presented in the supplementary online document which is available in the Computer Society Digital Library at http:// doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.2013.215 (Section 2). We have used this extended version in all implementations and experiments.
IMPLEMENTATION
Application Scenario
One of the most popular rating scenarios on the web is movie rating. IMDb is one of the best known online movie rating systems. It uses an algorithm for calculating rating scores for movies which the web site owners do not disclose, wishing, as they declare, to keep it as effective as possible, but they explicitly say that their ranks are a weighted average. 6 Another movie rating and recommending system is MovieLens 7 provided by GroupLens research lab at the University of Minnesota. 8 MovieLens uses a collaborative filtering method to recommend movies to its users, based on their personal preferences. In this section we present the test results for our system using a partial copy of MovieLens data obtained from the GroupLens website. 9 The dataset contains 855,598 rating scores cast by 2,113 users on nearly 10,000 movies. This dataset also contains for every movie the corresponding rating score given by the top critics of Rotten Tomatoes movie rating website 10 , another well known movie rating system which we also use for comparison purposes.
MovieTrust
To test our methodology, we have designed and implemented a movie rating system, which we call MovieTrust, aiming to robustly calculate rating scores for movies. MovieTrust is composed of three components. One is the rating calculation engine, the backbone of the application, which calculates the rating scores based on locally stored data. The second component is an API which makes MovieTrust services available to users all around the Internet. The third component is an extension for the Google Chrome browser. At the moment this extension is developed specifically for IMDb website. 5 . http://www.grouplens.org/node/12 When the MovieTrust extension is installed on the Chrome browser and the user visits the IMDb page of a movie, the MovieTrust icon will appear in the right corner of the address bar and the user can simply click on it and see what rating score has been calculated by our system for that particular movie. Fig. 2 shows a screen shot of MovieTrust extension on the Chrome browser.
MovieTrust has a website 11 which provides all related information about the tool. The extension is available for download, to allow easy evaluation of the performance of our system and comparison with the well known movie ratings system, IMDb. MovieTrust is implemented using PHP as the programming language and MySQL as the database management system.
EXPERIMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Our algorithm has two main parameters which help users to tune the algorithm to obtain a behavior best suited for a particular application: (Section 3) and q (Section 3.1). To be able to compare our algorithm with the related work from the literature, we conducted experiments in order to find optimal values for and q and then use these values in the algorithm for comparison purposes. In the next part, we first generate synthetic datasets according to analysis of real-world data. Then, we apply different algorithms to these datasets and calculate the products' rating scores. The deviation of the calculated rating scores form the true values, reflected in the the algorithm's error rate, is used as a metric to measure the accuracy of the rating scores calculated by each algorithm. In the last part of this section, we evaluate the accuracy of our calculated rating scores using a real-world dataset.
Datasets
We use a synthetic dataset for the purpose of analyzing the behavior of our algorithm with different values of and q, and also for performance comparison. There are two reasons for using a synthetic dataset. First, we need ground truth levels for the purpose of accuracy measurement. None of the existing real-world datasets provide such ground truth levels. Second, we need to evaluate the performance of our algorithm in different scenarios, such as having evaluators with different error rates or in the presence of collusion attacks. Since we do not know the real behavior of users in real-world datasets, they are not suitable for conducting such experiments.
We use the MovieLens 100 k dataset 12 as a guide to generate our synthetic datasets. More precisely, we extract the following statistical parameters from the MovieLens dataset:
1. the number of evaluators, 2. the number of movies, 3. the statistical distribution of the number of votes per evaluator, 4. the statistical distribution of the number of votes per movie.
The dataset contains 943 evaluators and 1,682 movies. So, we generate a dataset with exactly the same number of evaluators and movies. We assign each movie a ''true value'' uniformly randomly selected from the range [1, 10] except for the last movie which will be the target of a collusion attack. We let the last movie have the quality of 1 out of 10. Similarly, we assign each evaluator r a standard deviation r randomly and uniformly in the range [1, 5] .
Evaluators with high values of r are assumed to cast reviews with low credibility. Using the standard statistical estimation tools provided by Matlab software package, we have determined that in the MovieLens dataset, distribution of the number of votes per movie fits a random variable X ¼ etað0:5753; 8:4141Þ with the distribution. Similarly, distribution of the number of votes per evaluator fits a random variable Y ¼ etað1:3247; 19:5008Þ. We generate the dataset so that each movie is rated with at least 20 evaluators and each evaluator has rated at least 20 movies. For each evaluator, we obtain the number of movies that she will rate as a value of the random variable Y , denoting it by k r and for each movie we randomly select number of votes it can receive using the random variable Y ; the particular movies each voter will rate are selected randomly from such a pool of total available votes movies can receive. We assume that each evaluator r votes honestly but with accuracy corresponding to their standard deviation r . So, the rating score given by an evaluator to a movie is generated using a normal distribution with the mean equal to the ''true rating'' of the movie and the standard deviation r . All cast evaluations are rounded to be in the range of 1 to 10.
We use this dataset as a base for generating collusion included datasets. We assume that in a collusion attack, a group of N c users collaborate to boost the rating score of the last movie from 1 to 10. Such colluders first randomly choose 106 movies and cast evaluations on them to build a reputation history. Thereafter, colluders give the rating 10 to the last movie. The number 106 is calculated based on the Based on the value of , we design two collusion scenarios. In the first scenario, is the the maximum of all standard deviations assigned to evaluators. In other words, colluders behave similar to the least accurate members of the community. In the second scenario which is harder to detect, colluders vote like an average evaluator. More precisely, they vote with equal to the average of all standard deviations assigned to evaluators. In both scenarios, we change the size of the attack, i.e., N c , from 10 percent to 100 percent of the number of evaluations cast on the last movie.
To decrease the impact of random generation of data on the results, we generate 100 different base datasets and then use them to generate datasets which include a collusion. Thus, the result of an experiment is, in fact, the mean of the results calculated for all 100 datasets. All experiments are conducted on a Windows 7, 64 bit machine with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with 4 GB memory. All algorithms are implemented in MATLAB R2012b.
Algorithm Behavior Analysis
The parameter is responsible for tuning the behavior of our algorithm when calculating credibility levels. It defines the level of discrimination which our algorithm applies to marginalise people who deviate from the community sentiment. The larger the value of , the more discriminative the algorithm is. On the other hand, q impacts the nature of the calculated ranks; as already mentioned, higher values for q result in convergence of the rating scores towards the levels with the maximum credibility.
In order to find suitable values for and q, we have tested our algorithm on synthetic data with different values and measure the accuracy of our algorithm accordingly. Specifically, we change the value of from 0.5 to 4 with the step of 0.5, and the value of q from 0.1 to 3.0 with the step of 0.1. The result is presented in Fig. 3 . As shown in this figure, the highest accuracy levels are obtained when the q value is around 1.5 and for 1:8 2:8. Thus, in our subsequent experiments we use such empirically obtained values q ¼ 1:5 and ¼ 2.
Performance Comparison
In this section, we compare the performance of our algorithm with two other state of the art algorithms. The first is proposed by De Kerchove et al. in [17] and completed in [18] , referred to as DeKerchove. In this algorithm, an affine function [18] is employed as the discrimination function. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the most robust algorithms in the area. The second algorithm for comparison is one of the pioneering iterative algorithms, proposed by Laureti and his colleagues, referred to as Laureti [19] . More details about these related work are presented in Section 7.
We use the Root Mean Square (RMS) error as the performance comparison metric
where n is the number of movies rated. We fist apply each algorithm to a dataset and compute the movies rating scores. We find the root mean square of deviation of these rating scores from the true values which were used to generate our synthetic dataset. The overall RMS error of an algorithm is the average of all errors obtained by applying the algorithm to all 100 dataset. Smaller RMS errors mean that the ranks were closer to the true values and consequently indicate a higher accuracy. Fig. 4 shows the results of applying our algorithm alongside the two related algorithms on synthetic datasets explained earlier in Section 6.1. The illustration in Fig. 4a shows the RMS errors of algorithms when error rates of colluders is the maximum of all error rates in the community. In other words, colluders behave similar to the most erroneous evaluator in the community. The second illustration, i.e., Fig. 4b , represents the RMS errors of all three algorithms when dealing with ''smarter'' colluders, who behave like an average person in community (the standard deviation of the colluders equal to the average standard deviation in the community). The charts show that our model outperforms both DeKerchove and Laureti algorithms by generating smaller RMS errors in both experiments.
For a better comparison, we also compare the time complexity of our algorithm with DeKerchove and Laureti algorithms. As we explained in Section 1 of the supplementary part of the paper, the time complexity of all these three algorithms is OðL Â NÞ. It is notable that in a community of N members and L products, the worst case from time complexity point of view, is the case in which everybody has voted every product; so a rating algorithm can not have a time complexity better than OðL Â NÞ. To summarise, although our model has a time complexity similar to DeKerchove and Laureti, it outperforms these algorithms in achieving lower RMS errors, and hence more accurate rating scores. 
Evaluating Performance Using Real-World Data
In this section we assess the accuracy of the rating scores calculated by our algorithm using a real-world dataset. We use the MovieLens dataset, discussed in Section 5.1. As we described earlier, real-world datasets suffer from a lack of the ground truth levels. In such cases, experts' opinions are widely accepted as dependable estimations of the real quality of products [2] . Rotten Tomatoes movie critics (RTCritics), for example, are people who are selected as critics only if they have a relevant expertise in movie evaluation. 13 Thus, we use the opinion of top critics from Rotten Tomatoes as domain experts to assess the accuracy of the movie rating scores we have computed. The critics' opinions are extracted from the MovieLens dataset.
Out of more than 9,000 movies in our MovieLens dataset, we had the RTCritics ranks for only about 4,000 of them; however, this is still too larg to fit into a readable chart. So, we have randomly selected 100 movies and compared our rating scores with IMDb and RTCritics scores. Figs. 5a and 5b represent results of such a comparison. As illustrated in these figures, our scores are slightly higher than RTCritics but they closely conform to experts' opinions and IMDb scores. The fact that our scores are slightly higher than Rotten tomato critics is because such scores are obtained from the ratings provided by the general public, who tend to be less harsh than the expert movie critics of Rotten Tomatoes.
RELATED WORK
As demonstrated in [20] , as the rating systems get more and more popular and more users rely on them to decide on purchases from online stores, the temptation to obtain fake rating scores for products or fake reputation scores for people has dramatically increased. To detect such reviews, Mukherjee et al., [12] propose a model for spotting fake review groups in online rating systems. The model analyzes textual feedbacks cast on products in Amazon online market to find collusion groups. They employ FIM [14] algorithm to identify candidate collusion groups and then use 8 indicators to identify colluders. In [13] authors assign every review a degree of spam value, and based on these values they identify most suspicious users and investigate their behavior to find most likely colluders. In [21] , authors propose a collusion detection algorithm, based on clustering techniques, which uses 6 indicators to detect possible collusive groups of evaluators. In [22] authors try to identify fake reviews by looking for unusual patterns in posted reviews.
In a more general setup, collusion detection has been studied in P2P and reputation management systems; good surveys can be found in [23] and [10] . EigenTrust [24] is a well known algorithm proposed to produce collusion free reputation scores; however, authors in [25] demonstrate that it is not robust against collusion. Another series of works [26] , [27] , [28] use a set of signals and alarms to point to a suspicious behavior. The most famous ranking algorithm of all, the PageRank algorithm [15] was also devised to prevent collusive groups from obtaining udeserved ranks for webpages.
Iterative methods for trust evaluation and ranking have been pioneered in [19] , [29] . Some of the ideas from these papers, as the authors mention, were among the staring points of [17] , [30] , [18] ; the proof techniques which we used in this paper were inspired by the techniques developed in [17] .
The algorithm proposed in [19] by Laureti and his colleagues is a classic iterative algorithm which uses the distance of the approximate ranks being computed to the ratings provided by a user to calculate the trust rank of such a user. Such obtained trust ranks are in turn used to weigh this user's ratings when the new approximation of the ranks of items are obtained as a weighted average of the ratings of all users. While authors provide a comprehensive statistical analysis of the behavior of their algorithm, its robustness against collusion is not well studied.
De Kerchove and Dooren have proposed a set of iterative voting systems for calculating rating scores and called it ''iterative filtering'' [18] . A detailed proof is provided for the convergence of their algorithms. However, the performance of this work is not evaluated in the presence of massive intelligent collusion attacks.
The algorithm proposed by Zhou et al. [31] uses Pearson correlation coefficient to find the correlation between reviewers and the true values, and assign weights to their cast reviews based on this correlation. The algorithm shows a good performance when applied to both synthetic and real-world data. Six reputation based rating algorithms have been proposed by Li et al. [32] . The main difference between these six algorithms is in the method by which 13 . http://www.rottentomatoes.com/critics/ they calculate the distance from the approximations of the rating scores, and the aggregation method which they use to build the trust ranks. The main shortcoming of this work is that the its performance is not well studied in the presence of unfairness. Ayday and coauthors [33] have proposed another iterative algorithm for trust and reputation management. Unlike other related work, this algorithm blacklists outliers and eliminates their evaluations entirely. In [34] , authors have proposed a formal definition for collaborative reputation systems. They rely on iterative techniques, mainly iterative filtering algorithms, to propose and test their model. Finally, in [35] , authors have proposed an iterative model for managing reputation of users, based on the ratings they have received on their comments. They propose a bias-smoothed tensor model with a high level of complexity. One key difference between this work and other related work is that they calculate reputation scores and bias of the evaluators in both general and specific contexts. For example, in a question answering web site like Yahoo! Answers, in addition to the overall reputation scores, reputation of each member in contexts such as politics, sport, etc., is also calculated.
Our present method sharply differs from all of these prior iterative methods by virtue of entirely decoupling the credibility assessment from the score aggregation. More precisely, the main idea used in [19] , [29] as well as in [17] , [30] , [18] is to produce at each stage of iteration an approximation of the final ratings of the objects and then calculate for each rater the degree of her ''belief divergence'' from such calculated approximations, i.e., calculate some distance measure between her proposed ranks and these approximations of the final ranks of objects. In the subsequent round of iteration a new approximation of the ranks of all objects is obtained as a weighted average of the ranks proposed by raters, with the weight given to each rater's rank inversely related to her corresponding distance from the approximate final ranks obtained in the previous round of iteration. Thus, in this manner, the ranks of objects are produced simultaneously with an assessment of the trustworthiness of the raters as reflected in the weights given to their proposed ranks. Unfortunately, such algorithms suffer a very serious stability problem: if during the initial stages of iteration the current approximation gets close to the scores of a particular rater, such algorithms converge rapidly to these scores and give a zero weight to all other raters. Such situation can happen either accidentally or as a result of a collusion attack. In such an attack a group of colluding raters C 1 ; . . . ; C n propose unrealistic evaluations, while another colluder C 0 proposes evaluations which are the mean of the realistic marks, likely to be close to the average of marks given by other, non-colluding raters, and the skewed evaluations of the colluders. In such a scenario it is very likely that the initial approximation produced by the standard iterative filtering algorithms will be very close to the evaluations provided by C 0 and will cause such algorithms to converge to evaluations of C 0 .
14 To overcome such a problem, the authors in [17] , [30] , [18] introduce a regularisation constant which ensures that the distance between an approximation of the final ratings and the evaluations cast by any of the raters cannot become arbitrarily small. However, if such a constant is sufficiently large to ensure stability and robustness of the algorithm, the final rating scores become very close to the simple mean of all cast ratings.
In contrast, our iterative method operates only on credibility assessment of raters and on the levels of the community approval of items, which are obtained without using the fact that the items voted on are rating levels. In fact, as it is obvious from our algorithm, we have never used any comparisons of the proposed rating levels or even any ordering of the rating levels. We only rely on the levels of concurrence of the opinions of raters. This not only makes our algorithm unconditionally stable and collusion robust but also allows us to subsequently independently choose how to use the obtained estimates of the 'community sentiment' to produce the aggregate rating scores of products.
The second author and his co-authors, unaware of the pioneering work in [19] , [29] , [17] , [30] , [18] , have proposed in [36] a fixed-point algorithm for trust evaluation in online communities and subsequently in [37] an algorithm for aggregating assignment marks given by multiple assessors. This method was later applied to aggregation of sensor readings in wireless sensor networks, in the presence of sensor faults [38] . He also proposed the idea of applying an iterative procedure for vote aggregation to his collaborators in [39] ; however no proof of convergence of the method was provided there, and, more importantly, the proposed method had some serious shortcomings. In the notation of 14 . This attack strategy is due to Mohsen Rezvani (private communication, unpublished, with a permission). the present paper, denoting again the total number of voters by N and total number of voting lists by L, the recursion for computing the trustworthiness T r of a rater V r proposed in [39] was given by Unfortunately, the normalizing factor in the denominator on the righthand side can become excessive as the number of voters who did not vote in any elections in which V r has voted increases, making the rank computation unstable. Also, the exponent p pþ1 is always smaller than 1, and this severely limits the robustness of the proposed method against collusion attacks. The algorithm aimed to relate (a power of) the ratios between trustworthiness of any two voters to the ratios of the numbers of votes received by the candidates chosen by these voters. It also normalized the trustworthiness of voters, instead of normalizing the credibility of levels; however, as we do it in our present algorithm, normalizing credibility of levels, which are going to be used as weights in a subsequent (independent) computation of ranks of objects, not only makes more sense but also allows an elegant proof of convergence, missing in [39] .
In summary, unlike the existing models for collusion detection, we do NOT rely on any clustering techniques, local indicators or averaging; also, our method does not rely on any approximation of the final rating scores, making rating an entirely independent process from the credibility assessment.
CONCLUSION
As we have mentioned, existing iterative methods, such as [19] , [29] , [17] , [30] , [18] , approximate ranks using techniques involving weighted averages. However, averages generally have the propensity to blur statistical features because they smooth out data. In our method, the trustworthiness of raters is computed purely from the concurrence of opinions, without any averaging at all. In fact, note that in our ''rating-through-voting'' method, the ordering of the range of credibility levels (i.e., an increasing ordering from e.g., 1 to 10) is NOT considered at allVwe treat such domain as an unordered set, and only consider the concurrence of opinions. Such obtained trustworthiness of raters and the credibility degrees of quality levels can then be used to obtain the values of the rating scores in a completely decoupled way, for example, by taking a weighted average with weights obtained as some function of the credibility scores obtained for each rating level, or by choosing the highest ranked level or many other possible ways, depending on what kind of statistical feature we are mining the submitted evaluation data. Making rating an entirely independent process from the credibility assessment made our algorithm more robust than the standard iterative filtering algorithms. However, in our future work, we will further refine our method by taking into account the notions such as the perceived helpfulness of a review, the confidence of a rater in the validity of his evaluation as well as the ordering of the rating levels, with the aim to produce a complete yet fully flexible rating methodology which can be precisely tuned to produce rating scores reflecting desired features of the evaluation data available.
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